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Fred Dretske grounds, or reasons, when the question ‘How does S know?’ can sensibly be asked and answered, the evidence, grounds, or reasons must be. Fred Dretske is an epistemologist who proposed in his essay “Conclusive Reasons,” that evidence, grounds, and reasons should be considered as. On Dretske’s view knowing p is roughly a matter of having a reason R for believing p which meets the following condition (‘CR’ for conclusive.

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Suppose, then, that 1 S knows that P and he knows this on the concclusive simply of R entails 2 R would not be conclisive case ddetske P were the case. For while our inability to rule out not-p stops conc,usive from knowing p it does not stop us from knowing things that entail p.

We might insist that p itself is a conclusive reason for believing q when we know p and p entails q. The electrons themselves are invisible, but the scientist can perceive that the invisible electrons are moving in certain ways by perceiving that the visible bubbles left behind are arranging themselves in specific ways.

Roughly connclusive, the set of things we know is closed under entailment or under deduction or logical implicationso we know that a given claim is true upon recognizing, and accepting thereby, that it follows from what we know. This assumption might rest on the idea that any belief M yields is, at best, accidentally correct, if in any circumstances M yields a false or an accidentally correct belief Luper b,c.

The arguments against closure include the following: Broad Michael Burke C. Second, S might be propositionally justified in believing q on the basis of p whether or not S fails to see that p entails qand even if S believes q for bogus reasons.

History of Western Philosophy. When R meets this condition, let us say that R is a safe indicator that p is true. Reasons in a World of Causes. Concludive are true if we analyze indication and information as follows: To say that justified belief is closed under entailment is to say that something like one of the following principles is correct or that both are:.

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How compelling is this argument? But being limiting does not coincide with being elusive. As this reasoning shows, the unknowability of claims like not-win together with the knowability of claims like not-buy position us to launch another challenge to closure. And even this more limited position can be challenged adapting a charge against Nozick in Shatz Another anticlosure argument is that there are some sorts of propositions we cannot know unless perhaps we take extraordinary measures, yet such propositions are entailed by mundane claims whose truth we do know.

We may perceive that we have hands, for example, without perceiving that there are physical things. Consider the lottery example dertske. These points can be restated in terms of the conclusive reasons account.

Let us consider the story they present, and some worries about its acceptability. If S remembers pand S believes q because S knows p entails q dretsk, then S remembers q.

In other words, the issue is whether the reasns principle is true: However, this assumption is false HawthorneLuper If no red barn were there I would believe neither that there was a barn, nor that there was a red barn, reasonx red-barn percepts.

Do you know not-mule? However, GJ generates paradoxes Kyburg But, as Moore claimed, skeptics are wrong when they say we do not know that skeptical hypotheses are false. But now suppose that the neighborhood has no fake red barns; the only fake barns are blue.

We can reject GJ.

Fred I. Dretske, Conclusive reasons – PhilPapers

If S perceives pand S believes q because S knows p entails qthen S perceives q. That is, in the close worlds to the actual world in which not-p holds, S does not believe p. While proponents of closure have responses to these arguments, they also argue, somewhat in the style of G. Perhaps we think that p entails q because we think everything drerske everything, or because we have a concusive tingly feeling between our toes.

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David Armstrongp. Let us turn to their arguments.

Epistemic Closure

How to join Forgot your password? The standards a method must meet to produce knowledge depend on the context in which it is used. Sign in Create an account. In that case GK will not succumb to our objection to GJfor if the probability of two or more propositions is 1 then the probability of their conjunction conclusife also 1.

Dretske rejects these three principles because he thinks perception, indication and information are best analyzed in terms of conclusive reasons, which undermines closure.

We will consider this third view in the next section. Moorethat closure itself is a firm datum—it is obvious enough to rule out any understanding of knowledge or related notions that undermines closure. Drdtske the close worlds in which I believe red barnI am correct, so I meet the requisite condition for knowing red barnwhich is that my believing red barn safely indicates its own truth. Raymond Martin – – Philosophical Dretsks 28 3: Still, it is surprising that Dretske cited the red barn case as the basis for preferring his version of tracking over Nozick’s.

A version of PC may be defended if we make use of Dretske’s own notion of indirect perception Oxford University Press, pp.

At the time when cognitive science was proposing mind models based on input and output from digital computers, Dretske likened the problem of knowledge to an analysis of the information communicated by statements or propositions which he called “digital” and by pictures or images which he called “analog”.

M must be strengthened somehow, say with a supplemental method, or with evidence about the circumstances at hand, if knowledge is to be procured. Suppose we continue to add conjuncts.